One of the key dimensions of immigrant integration is citizenship acquisition. Naturalisation plays a significant role in the European Union, with approximately 1.1 million people acquiring EU citizenship in 2023. Becoming a citizen of one’s country of residence grants full civic and political rights, allowing migrants to participate equally in society and assume the same rights and responsibilities as native-born nationals. As such, it represents a crucial milestone in the integration process.
For second-generation migrants, who are born in their country of residence, acquiring citizenship often enables a formal alignment between their nationality and place of birth. Unlike in the United States, where jus soli (birthright citizenship) guarantees automatic citizenship to anyone born on American soil, no European country fully applies jus soli. Instead, European countries grant citizenship based on jus sanguinis (citizenship by descent) or conditional forms of jus soli, which impose additional requirements on children of migrants. These legal barriers can delay or complicate the citizenship process, leaving many second-generation migrants to grow up in their country of birth without the full rights and security that citizenship provides. This, in turn, can affect their social mobility and long-term integration.
In 2023, 75% of second-generation migrants in Europe held the citizenship of their country of birth. However, citizenship rates vary significantly across countries (Figure 1). In some nations, the vast majority of second-generation migrants are nationals of their country of birth. For instance, 97% in Sweden and the Netherlands, 96% in Portugal, and 91% in France hold citizenship in their country of birth.
In general, the descendants of EU migrants are less likely than those of non-EU migrants to have acquired the citizenship of their country of birth and residence. While 70% of second-generation EU migrants hold citizenship in their country of birth, this share is higher among second-generation non EU migrants (77%). This difference largely reflects the different value that citizenship holds for the two groups. The children of EU migrants are already EU citizens by birth, even if their nationality does not match their country of birth and residence. As a result, acquiring the citizenship of their country of birth does not significantly alter their legal status. In contrast, for the children of non-EU migrants, obtaining citizenship in their country of birth means gaining an EU passport, which expands their opportunities for international mobility and access to a wider range of rights and benefits. Citizenship acquisition rates are considerably lower among first-generation migrants. Across the EU14, only 37% of first-generation migrants are citizens of their country of residence-with rates at 29% among EU migrants and 40% among non-EU migrants.
Figure 1: 75% of second-generation migrants are citizens of the country they were born in
Share of first- and second-generation immigrants aged 0-74 who are citizens of their country of birth (2023)
Beyond the EU/non-EU divide, there is also a clear educational gradient in naturalisation. More educated migrants are generally more likely to hold citizenship, a pattern that is stronger among second-generation migrants than among first-generation migrants and holds for both EU and non-EU groups. Across the EU14, 78% of low-educated second-generation migrants aged 15-74 are citizens of their country of birth and residence. This share is lower among those of EU origin (73%) but higher for those of non-EU origin (80%). Among those with intermediate education, 85% hold citizenship, while the figure rises to 92% for those with higher education. The respective shares for EU-origin second-generation migrants are 85% (intermediate education) and 90% (high education), while for non-EU second-generation migrants, they are 86% and 94%, respectively. Notably, many second generation migrants have not yet completed their education. Among those still in education, 86% hold citizenship, though with a marked difference between EU-origin (69%) and non-EU-origin (89%) second-generation migrants.
Figure 2: Naturalisation is more frequent among the more educated
Share of first- and second-generation immigrants aged 15-74 who are citizens of their country of birth in EU14 countries, by education (2023)
The likelihood of holding citizenship among second-generation migrants increases significantly with age. When pooling data from all countries that provide information on children under 15, we observe a clear upward trend. Among second-generation children aged 0-4, only 51% are citizens of their country of birth. This proportion rises steadily with age, reaching 60% among those aged 5-9, 73% among those aged 10-14, and 83% among those aged 15-19.
Figure 3: Among second generations, the probability of naturalisation increases with age
Share of second-generation immigrants who are citizens of their country of birth across European countries, by age (2023)
While the age gradient in naturalisation is evident across all countries, there are significant cross-country differences in the share of second-generation immigrant children who hold citizenship in their country of birth. Figure 4 illustrates these variations, highlighting how national policies and legal frameworks shape citizenship acquisition rates among second-generation migrants.
Figure 4: Second generation children, aged 0-14, have very low citizenship rates in some countries
Share of second-generation immigrants aged 0-14 who are citizens of their country of birth (2023)
In general, first- and second-generation immigrants who hold the citizenship of their country of birth and residence tend to have better labour market outcomes than those who do not.
Among individuals aged 25-64 across EU14 countries, second-generation immigrants with citizenship are 3 percentage points more likely to be employed than those without it.
However, it would be misleading to interpret these differences as purely reflecting a causal effect of citizenship on employment. Access to citizenship is selective on both the “supply” and “demand” sides. On the supply side, countries typically impose eligibility requirements for naturalisation, ensuring that applicants have resided in the country for a sufficient period, possess language proficiency, and demonstrate familiarity with the country’s culture and institutions. In some cases, applicants must also meet minimum income thresholds at the time of application. On the demand side, only foreign nationals who are motivated enough to apply-and who can afford both the financial costs (such as application fees) and the non-monetary burdens (such as paperwork and administrative hurdles) of the naturalisation process-will pursue citizenship. As a result, naturalised first- and second-generation migrants are likely to be positively selected, meaning they may have stronger labour market prospects than their non-naturalised counterparts even before acquiring citizenship. Despite this caveat, it is also possible that citizenship facilitates migrants’ labour market integration. When comparing naturalised and non-naturalised second-generation migrants with the same level of education, age, and gender, those who hold citizenship have an employment probability that is 2 percentage points higher. The naturalisation premium is even more pronounced for first-generation migrants, who are 7 percentage points more likely to be employed than their non-naturalised peers (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Naturalised migrants have higher employment probability than non-naturalised
Differences in employment probability between naturalised and non-naturalised first- and second-generation immigrants in EU14 countries, age 25-64 (2023)
The association between citizenship and occupational status is even stronger than for employment probability. Second-generation migrants without citizenship are 5 percentage points more likely to be employed in elementary occupations than their naturalised counterparts. Given that 10% of non naturalised second-generation migrants work in low-skilled jobs, this implies that holding citizenship is linked to a 50% lower likelihood of being in elementary occupations. Even after accounting for differences in age, education, and gender, naturalised second-generation migrants still have a 3 percentage point lower probability of working in a low-skilled job than those without citizenship.
At the other end of the occupational scale, naturalised second-generation migrants are 16 percentage points more likely to be employed in a highly skilled occupation than their non-naturalised peers. When adjusting for age, gender, and education, this advantage is reduced by half, but remains significant at 8 percentage points. Since 35% of non-naturalised second-generation migrants are employed in highly skilled occupations, this means that-even after accounting for the selectivity of naturalisation-holding citizenship is associated with a 23% higher probability of being in a high-skilled job compared to non-naturalised migrants (Figure 6).
Figure 6: Naturalised migrants are employed in more prestigious and better paid occupations
Differences in the probability of having an elementary or high skill occupation between naturalised and non-naturalised first- or second-generation immigrants in EU14 countries, age 25-64 (2023)
